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Abstract
This paper argues that the per-capita income of importers is an important determinant of the
extensive margin of trade. I formalize this by incorporating preferences that allow for binding non-
negativity constraints into an otherwise standard Ricardian model. This implies that agents adjust
the set of goods from which they consume with income, which in turn affects the extensive margin
of bilateral trade. I quantify the model using data on US consumer behavior and aggregate values
of bilateral trade flows. I find that the behavior of the model’s extensive margin of bilateral trade
is consistent with elasticities measured in the data. Two counterfactual experiments demonstrate
the quantitative importance of the mechanism outlined in this paper.
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1 Introduction
Trade flows greatly vary in the number of different goods that are traded between countries. This
“extensive margin of bilateral trade” can be thought of as the manifestation of an interplay of the
exporter’s production technology, the importer’s demand structure, and bilateral trade costs - it is
more likely that two countries trade a given good if the exporter is particularly strong in producing
this good, the importer has a especially high demand for that good, or bilateral trade barriers are low.
Most existing analyses of the extensive margin of bilateral trade focus on the exporter’s technology
and bilateral trade costs. This paper provides a complementary perspective by emphasizing the role
of the importing country’s demand structure.
For this purpose I adapt the Ricardian multi-country model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) (hence-
forth EK). In the EK framework the production technology is country-variety specific. Together with
trade costs this determines the price at which a supplying country can offer a variety in a particular
destination market. In any given destination market the producer country offering the lowest price will
be the sole supplier of this variety. However, whether this trade flow then actually materializes depends
not only on the supplier country’s good technology and low bilateral trade costs, but crucially also
on the importing country’s demand structure - particularly on if at the price offered there is actually
a positive demand for this variety. With the traditional CES preferences demand is always positive
since the marginal utility is unbounded. In this paper I relax this assumption and allow agents to
adjust the set of goods they purchase - henceforth called the “extensive margin of consumption” - with
income.1 In choosing their optimal consumption bundle agents order the varieties along their prices
and decide up to which price it is optimal to consume positive quantities. It therefore is possible that
for a given variety the lowest price offered by the supplier countries is still too high and the agents in
the importing country find it optimal not to consume (and therefore not to import) this variety. The
corresponding model is developed in Section 2.
A thus extended model helps to make sense of the empirical behavior of the extensive margin
of trade. It has been documented in several studies that richer countries both import and export
more varieties (see e.g. Hummels and Klenow (2002), Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), or Sauré (2009)).
Table 1 summarizes these findings by regressing the extensive margin of bilateral trade in consumption
1Jackson (1984) documented the empirical relevance of the “extensive margin of consumption” using US consumer
expenditure data. Falkinger and Zweimüller (1996) provide evidence that richer countries consume a broader set of
goods using the Worldbank’s ICP-data. Other studies documenting positive correlations between variety and income
include Jekanowski and Binkley (2000), Moon, Florkowski, Beuchat, Resurreccion, Paraskova, Jordanov, and Chinnan
(2002), Thiele and Weiss (2003) , and Li (2010) for food consumption and Gronau and Hamermesh (2008) documenting
similar effects in time use data.
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goods2 on the per-capita incomes and population sizes of the trading partners (controlling for bilateral
resistance).
Table 1
The positive elasticity of the exporter per-capita income can be understood as a standard Ricardian
mechanism: per-capita income is high due to a country’s good technology. But being technologically
advanced implies that this country is competitive in many industries and therefore tends to export a
broad set of varieties. However, at the same time this implies that the number of varieties that need to
be imported is relatively low. Allowing for the extensive margin of consumption to adjust with income
generates a countervailing force.
In order to assess whether this force is strong enough to dominate the negative effect coming from
the supply side I quantify the model in Section 3. I use the aggregate values of bilateral trade flows
to estimate the model’s technologies and trade costs and data on US consumer expenditure to pin
down the preference parameters. I then simulate the thus calibrated model and consider the behavior
of its extensive margin of bilateral trade. I find that the demand side forces are sufficiently strong to
dominate the negative effect of a good technology on the extensive margin of imports. Comparing the
income elasticities of the extensive margin of bilateral trade to the data I find that they are of the
right sign and close to the empirical elasticities.
What is the quantitative importance of this new demand side channel? To answer this question I
use the calibrated model to perform two classical counterfactual experiments - lowering trade costs and
the rise of China and India. A traditional model neglecting the demand side predicts that lower trade
costs lead to higher extensive margins of trade since trade becomes worthwhile for more varieties. This
effect is reinforced by the demand side. Lower trade cost lead to higher real incomes which induces
agents to expand their extensive margins of consumption. This then increases the number of traded
varieties. Quantitatively I find that the predicted increases in the extensive margins of bilateral trade
flows are at least twice as high when allowing for the extensive margin of consumption to adjust.
The second experiment considers the effect of technological progress in China and India. Better local
technologies imply that these countries will tend to produce more varieties locally since they become
more competitive. However, the rising incomes will lead consumers to expand the measure of varieties
that they consume. This effect dominates and therefore the model with non-homothetic preferences
2I consider consumption goods only since the channel proposed in this paper affects the patterns of final demand
only.
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predicts that the extensive margin of imports is rising, whereas a model neglecting demand side effects
would actually predict falling extensive margins.
In this paper I use the EK framework since it is parsimonious in the context of my objective - it
allows me to develop my argument in a very intuitive way and nevertheless provides me with a model
that is general enough to be directly quantified. The message of the demand side being an important
determinant of the extensive margin of trade however is more general. In Section 4 I discuss how the
demand side effects would play in a model of monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms and
what additional effects and complications may emerge. Remaining in the Ricardian framework Section
5 discusses a number of extensions. First, I show that accounting for trade in intermediates does not
significantly change the quantitative predictions of the model. Second, I consider the implications of
allowing for within-country inequality, and third I show that the results are not driven by the particular
functional form of the utility function. Section 6 concludes.
This paper contributes to two strands of the trade literature. First, by highlighting the role of the
importer’s demand structure it contributes to the broad literature investigating the extensive margin
of trade. Second, on a more theoretical side it contributes to the growing literature that recognizes
the potential importance of non-homothetic consumer behavior for understanding different aspect of
trade pattern - aggregate values of trade flows, differences in unit prices, and the extensive margin of
trade.3 As for the aggregate value of trade flows Fieler (2010) argues that non-homothetic preferences
help to explain the higher trade share of rich countries. She extends the EK model to two industries
with differing demand elasticities. Richer countries then relatively concentrate their expenditures in
the high-elasticity industries. If the variability in productivities across countries is relatively high in
these industries, their share of traded output will be high. Together with the demand pattern this
implies that rich countries’ trade shares are higher. With respect to the extensive margin of trade
however, her model’s predictions are similar to EK since agents do not adjust their extensive margin of
consumption. Another aspect of trade pattern where non-homotheticity is potentially relevant is the
variation in unit-prices across importing countries. Simonovska (2010) argues that differences in unit
prices reflect differing markups due to demand elasticities that change with income. Choi, Hummels,
and Xiang (2009) and Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2009) on the other hand understand
differences in unit-prices as reflecting quality differences due to a increasing taste for quality with
rising income. Concerning the extensive margin of trade Sauré (2009) argues that richer countries have
3For a more complete overview of the literature of non-homothetic preferences and trade see Markusen (2010).
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more trading partners (county level extensive margin) due to non-homothetic preferences and Foellmi,
Hepenstrick, and Zweimüller (2010) show that non-homothetic preferences can generate incentives for
parallel trade and influence the extensive margin of trade via this channel. This paper’s contribution is
a multi-country model of trade where the importing country’s consumers decide about their extensive
margin of consumption. This decision then determines together with the exporters technologies and
the structure of trade costs the extensive margins of bilateral trade flows.
2 A model of per-capita incomes and the extensive margin
The world economy consists of N countries. Country i’s population is denoted by Li. Each agent
is endowed with one unit of labor that is inelastically supplied on the domestic market. There is
one industry producing differentiated consumption goods. The measure of varieties is exogenous and
normalized to one.
2.1 Consumer behavior
Agents maximize the same symmetric additively separable utility function
U =
ˆ 1
0
v (x (j)) dj
subject to their budget constraints E ≥ ´ 1
0
p (j)x (j) dj and the non-negativity constraints x (j) ≥ 0∀j.
E denotes an agent’s income. The sub-utility function v (x) is concave, v′ (x) > 0 and v′′ (x) < 0, and
the marginal utility is bounded from above, v′ (0) < ∞. With bounded marginal utility the non-
negativity constraints are potentially binding and the corresponding first order conditions for a variety
j are
v′ (x (j)) = λp (j) for x (j) > 0
v′ (0) < λp (j) for x (j) = 0
(1)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Intuitively, an agent compares for every available variety j the
marginal utility from starting to consume this variety v′ (0) with her utility costs λp (j) associated
with buying a marginal unit of this variety. If the marginal costs are higher than the marginal utility
the optimal quantity is zero - the non-negativity constraint binds. For all other varieties the optimal
quantities are positive and are chosen such that the marginal rates of substitution equal relative prices.
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Figure 1 depicts the demand function for a particular variety j. Note that there is a finite price v′ (0) /λ
above which the optimal quantity is zero.
Figure 1
As the varieties enter the utility function symmetrically, agents simply order the varieties in their
prices (think of reindexing the varieties such that the prices rise in the index j) and then choose up
to which price they still want to consume positive quantities. I denote the index of this marginal
variety by M . Its price follows from rearranging the first order condition (1) when the non-negativity
constraint just binds, p (M) = v′ (0) /λ. As the indices are increasing in prices, M also denotes the
measure of varieties that are consumed in positive quantities and thus represents the extensive margin
of consumption in this model. Because the goods spectrum is normalized to one the extensive margin of
consumption simultaneously represents the share of available varieties consumed in positive quantities.
Assuming that the price distribution can be represented by a continuous cdf G (p) - this will be
the case in the general equilibrium - the share of consumed varieties (and therefore also the extensive
margin of consumption) is
M = G (v′ (0) /λ) . (2)
For varieties j < M the Marshallian demand follows from rearranging the first order condition,
x (λp) = v′−1 (λp). Inserting the Marshallian demand into the budget constraint and making the
change of variable p = G−1 (j) yields
E =
ˆ v′(0)/λ
0
px (λp) g (p) dp (3)
implicitely determining the marginal utility of income λ for a given price distribution G (p) and income
E. In the equilibrium we will know the price distribution and the income and thus be able to solve for
the multiplier λ. Using (2) one then solves for the extensive margin of consumption and (1) determines
the optimal quantities for varieties j < M .
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2.2 Production technology and market structure
The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and uses one input4, which I call labor.
Labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile within countries, but immobile across countries, so that in
equilibrium there will be one wage rate wi per country. zi (j) denotes country i’s productivity in
producing variety j. Assuming perfect competition and iceberg trade costs5 - dni units need to be
shipped in i for one unit to arrive at the destination n - implies that the price at which country i offers
variety j in country n is
pni (j) =
widni
zi (j)
. (4)
I follow EK and assume that the country-variety specific productivity zi (j) is the realization of a
Fréchet distributed random variable Zi (j)
Pr [Zi (j) ≤ z] = exp
{−Tiz−θ} .
Ti is country specific and governs the expected productivity draw. I will therefore refer to Ti as country
i’s technology (a higher Ti implies a higher expected productivity and therefore represents a better
technology in country i). θ is common to all countries and controls the variation in the productivities
(the lower θ the more variation there is in productivity draws). I will show later on that θ also governs
the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to trade cost, which is why I sometimes will call θ the
trade elasticity.
2.3 Equilibrium
All countries i are in principle able to produce each variety j. However, consumers will source each
variety from only one producing country - the country offering the lowest price. International trade
thus emerges if this country with the lowest price is a foreign country. In Appendix B.1 I show that
the lowest prices on offer in country n can be represented by a cdf
Gn (p) = 1− exp
{−Φnpθ} , (5)
4For parsimony I abstain from modeling multiple inputs. This will imply that in the calibration differences in
non-tradable endowments (e.g. human and physical capital) and differing price-indices for tradable intermediates are
absorbed into the calibrated technology. For non-tradable endowments and in the context of the counterfactuals this is
admissible. For tradable intermediate inputs I will show in the robustness-section how the results change when allowing
for them.
5I normalize trade costs within countries to one, dnn = 1 for all n, and assume that the triangle inequality, dni ≤
dkidnk holds for all i, k, and n.
7
where
Φn =
N∑
i=1
Ti (widni)
−θ
.
I.e. Gn (p) represents the share of varieties in country n with a price (weakly) below p. As all agents
are endowed with one unit of labor the income of a country n agent is simply the wage rate, wn
(to be endogenously determined). For a given wage rate the budget restriction (3) together with the
price distribution therefore determines the marginal utility in country n, λn. The extensive margin of
consumption in n follows immediately,
Mn = 1− exp
{
−Φn (v′ (0) /λn)θ
}
. (6)
In Appendix B.2 I derive the probability pini that a producer country i is the cheapest supplier in
the importing country n for a particular variety,
pini =
Ti (widni)
−θ
Φn
.
Since there is a continuum of goods, pini is also the share of varieties for which country i is the cheapest
supplier in n. Because the probability is the same for all goods pini is not only the share of the total
goods spectrum, but also the share for any sub-spectrum; in particular also for an importing country’s
extensive margin of consumption. But this implies that the extensive margin of the bilateral trade flow
from i to n, which I denote bymni, is simply the importing country’s extensive margin of consumption,
Mn, multiplied by the share of varieties for which the exporter i is the cheapest producer, pini,
mni = piniMn. (7)
The source of the remarkable simplicity of this result is worth discussing: The distributional as-
sumption of the EK framework implies that conditional on entering a market n prices have the same
distribution across supplier countries (Appendix B.3 provides the corresponding derivations).6 There-
fore the prices of the goods that the importer n actually buys bear no information about the likely
source of these goods, so that pini is the share of varieties of any subinterval of the variety space for
6Eaton and Kortum (forthcoming) call this feature “neutrality”. Note that neutrality is not unique to the Ricardian
framework. E.g. in the monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and market entry costs neutrality
follows if market entry costs are only destination specific and productivities are drawn from Pareto distributions. Costinot
and Komunjer (2007) provide a discussion of general productivity distributions in the Ricardian multi-country framework.
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which the supplier i offers the cheapest price in n - in particular also for the subintervalMn representing
the Mn percent cheapest varieties.
Since the distribution of prices of goods that are actually sold in n is the same across supplier
countries i, average sales do not vary source neither. In particular, average sales in n are given by total
expenditures wnLn divided by the extensive margin of consumption, wnLn/Mn. The aggregate value
of the bilateral trade flow from i to n, Xni is given by average sales multiplied by the the measure of
varieties for which i is the cheapest supplier in n and which are actually consumed in positive quantities
- the extensive margin of trade, mni - which yields
Xni = piniwnLn. (8)
Note that taking the derivative of the log of volumes with respect to the log of trade costs yields θ
(neglecting general equilibrium effects on the wage rates) which is why θ is sometimes called the trade
elasticity.
To close the model and determine the equilibrium wage vector I use the labor market clearing
conditions7
wiLi =
N∑
n=1
Ti (widni)
−θ∑N
k=1 Tk (wkdnk)
−θwnLn for i = 1, ..., N. (9)
In summary, the structure of the global economy is characterized by the countries’ technologies, Ti,
and populations, Li, the matrix of bilateral trade costs, dni, the trade elasticity, θ, and the shape of
the utility function, v (·). In the general equilibrium producers price according to (4) and consumers
choose their optimal quantities and extensive margins (6) as implied by (1). Market clearing (9) pins
down the set of equilibrium wage rates and bilateral trade pattern are characterized by their aggregate
value (8) and their extensive margin (7).8
7The labor market clearing condition follows for example from imposing balanced trade,
∑
k 6=iXik =
∑
n 6=iXni, and
adding the domestically sourced consumption, Xii, on both sides to get
∑N
k=1Xik =
∑N
n=1Xni. Total expenditures
in i are wiLi =
∑N
k=1Xik. Substituting for Xni and pini on the right hand side then yields the labor market clearing
condition as stated in the text.
8The general equilibrium exists and is unique. To see this note that the labor market clearing conditions can be
rewritten as excess demands for labor. It is straight forward to show that the resulting system of excess demands
satisfies the sufficient properties for existence and uniqueness (see for example Propositions 17.B.2 and 17.F.3 in Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)). The extensive margins and the optimal quantities are unique as they follow from
maximizing a concave object over a convex constraint. As wages and extensive margins fully summarize the general
equilibrium this implies that the general equilibrium is unique.
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2.4 The role of per-capita incomes
In this section I discuss how per-capita incomes affect trade pattern and contrast the results to the
standard model with homothetic preferences.9 In the context of this paper the role of non-homothetic
preferences is to endogenize the extensive margin of consumption. Figure 2 illustrates this by depicting
equation (6).
Figure 2
The price of the marginal variety is v′ (0) /λn. Using the country specific price distribution Gn (p) one
gets the share of varieties with prices lower than this marginal price and thus the share (and measure)
of varieties that are consumed in positive quantities - the extensive margin of consumption. An increase
in per-capita income lowers the marginal utility of income λn and thus increases the extensive margin
of consumption - richer countries consume a broader set of varieties. A first order stochastic dominance
shift in the price distribution increases the extensive margin of consumption as well - countries that are
better integrated and have therefore lower prices will consume broader sets of varieties. Note finally
that for v′ (0)→∞ the extensive margin goes towards one and agents would not adjust their extensive
margins with income.
In the Ricardian model, a country’s per-capita income depends on that country’s technology - the
better technology, the higher the wage rate and thus per-capita income. In the model there are two
channels of how an importing country n’s technology affects the extensive margin of trade. The first
channel is the standard supply side channel. A better technology implies better productivity draws for
more varieties so that the share of varieties pinn for which local producers offer the best prices rises.
But this implies that the share of varieties that are imported, (1− pinn), and therewith the extensive
margin of bilateral trade tends to fall. On the other hand the non-homothetic model exhibits a second
channel. Better technology leads to higher wages and agents therefore extend their extensive margin
of consumption, which tends to increase the extensive margin of trade. In the calibrated version of
model it will turn out that the latter effect dominates so that the extensive margin of bilateral trade
is positively correlated with per-capita incomes. In the homothetic model on the other hand only
the first effect is present (all countries’ extensive margins of consumption are one) and the correlation
between extensive margin of trade and importer income is unambiguously negative. Note also that
9With homothetic preferences expenditure shares are constant. One can show that a linear transformation of the
widely used CES-preferences is indeed the most general form of additively separable homothetic preferences. Note that
homotheticity (for additive preferences) requires v′ (0) =∞ as otherwise sufficiently poor agents do not buy an expensive
variety, i.e. their expenditure share is zero, whereas the expenditure share of sufficiently rich agents is positive, which
contradicts homotheticity.
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in the non-homothetic model the decomposition of aggregate gdp into population size and per-capita
income matters - a rich, but small country has a high extensive margin of consumption and thus also
tends to import broad sets of varieties, whereas the opposite is true for a poor, but large country
although the two countries may have the same aggregate gdp.
Whereas the non-homothetic and the homothetic model can have opposing predictions for the
extensive margin of bilateral trade, they exhibit the same pattern for the aggregate volumes. This
feature will be very useful when calibrating the model and comparing its performance to the the
homothetic model. Note also that with respect to aggregate volumes both models do not have separate
roles for differences in per-capita incomes that are induced by differing technologies.10
3 Quantifying the model
In this section I quantify the model to assess whether my theory is able to explain the behavior of the
extensive margin of trade. I calibrate the model parameters using data on aggregate trade volumes
and US consumer behavior. I then simulate the parametrized model and compare the behavior of its
extensive margin of bilateral trade with the data.
3.1 Parametrization of the utility function
I have shown above that the effects discussed emerge for a broad class of sub-utility functions v (x).
The central property is a bounded marginal utility, v′ (x) <∞. To quantify the model I need to choose
a parametric form for v (x) . I will use the Stone-Geary form
v (x) = log (x¯+ x) ,
where x¯ ≥ 0, as the thus parametrized model nests the standard homothetic model with x¯ = 0.11 The
preference parameter x¯ represents the degree of non-homotheticity. In the context of this paper it is
particularly important that it governs the marginal utility of starting to consume an additional variety,
v′ (0) = 1/x¯. The closer the non-homotheticity parameter x¯ gets to zero the larger the marginal utility
10In the data richer countries tend to trade more. One potential explanation is brought forward by Waugh (2010)
who argues that richer countries have systematically lower trade costs. I will capture this in the calibration by following
Waugh (2010)’s approach to modeling trade costs.
11For x¯ = 0 the preferences become CES preferences with an elasticity of substitution of one. Since the quantitative
behavior of the homothetic model is independent of the elasticity of substitution (see Alvarez and Lucas (2007)) the
results represent the general CES model.
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ofs consuming new varieties and thus the weaker the demand side effects on the extensive margin of
trade. For x¯ = 0 the marginal utility approaches infinity and agents find it optimal to consume all
available varieties no matter how expensive they are.
In the robustness section I will show that the results remain unchanged for alternative preferences
specifications with bounded marginal utility such as quadratic preferences and CARA preferences.
3.2 Calibration strategy
The theoretical model’s bilateral trade pattern are characterized by two moments - the extensive
margins and aggregate volumes. Volumes are governed by
Xni = piniwnLn
and the extensive margins are
mni = piniMn.
Labor market clearing wiLi =
∑N
n=1Xni determines the equilibrium wage rates and the equilibrium
extensive margins of consumption follow from the budget restriction (3). In Appendix B.4 show that
with Stone-Geary preferences the budget restriction can be written as
wn = x¯ (Φn)
− 1θ
(
Mn (− log (1−Mn))
1
θ − γ
(
1
θ
+ 1;− log (1−Mn)
))
, (10)
where γ (z, t¯) =
´ t¯
0
tz−1e−tdt is the incomplete Gamma function.
The model parameters are the countries technologies Ti and populations Li, the bilateral trade
costs dni, the non-homotheticity parameter x¯, and the trade elasticity θ. Whereas the populations can
be taken from the data, I need to calibrate the remaining parameters. In the following I describe how
I calibrate these parameters. The data used for the calibration is discussed en passant with a more
complete description in Appendix A.12 I start with the calibration strategy for the non-homotheticity
parameter as this is the most novel part of the model. I then discuss the trade elasticity, trade costs,
and technologies in turn. The sample consists of 164 countries and I consider the year 2003. Table 6
lists the countries in the sampe.
12The MATLAB code used for the calibration is available upon request.
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3.2.1 Non-homotheticity parameter
To calibrate the non-homotheticity parameter I use data of the US Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) of the year 2003. The advantage of using this source is its independence from the trade
data. Based on this database I construct the expenditures of around 3000 households for 107 different
categories of tradable goods such as “Encyclopedia and other sets of reference books”, “Wigs, hairpieces,
or toupees “, and “Winter sports equipment”. Details can be found in Appendix A.5. Counting the
categories with positive expenditure gives me a measure for the extensive margin of consumption of a
household. Table 2 reports the elasticity of this measure of the extensive margin with respect to total
expenditures controlling for demographic variables such as household size, age of the reference person,
and geography, i.e. rural/urban and region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West).
Table 2
Table 2 also reports the elasticities for a more liberal expenditure classification that comprises 186
categories.13 Clearly, the positive elasticity is robust across specifications lying between 0.4 and 0.5.
For the calibration I will target the elasticity associated with the conservative classification and the
specification including all controls, 0.41.
To understand the details of the calibration, first note that for trade volumes only the relative
technologies matter, which implies that we cannot identify the absolute level of the technologies using
aggregate trade volumes. In the budget constraint (10) on the other hand the absolute level of tech-
nologies is relevant since it determines the level of Φn. Moreover note that scaling all technologies by
a constant has the same effect as scaling the non-homotheticity parameter. Therefore I can normalize
either the level of technologies or the preference parameter. It is convenient to choose to normalize the
level of the technologies such that the US-aggregator, ΦUS , equals one. Then the budget constraint of
a US-agent h with income wh is
wUS,h = x¯
(
MUS,h (− log (1−MUS,h))
1
θ − γ
(
1
θ
+ 1;− log (1−MUS,h)
))
.
Setting θ = 4.5 (see next section) and for a given non-homotheticity parameter x I can feed all the
CEX households’ incomes into the budget constraint and calculate corresponding extensive margins of
13The main difference lies in the treatment of housing- and gender-related categories. The conservative classification
excludes these categories, whereas the liberal classification aggregates over categories that represent the same item but
differentiate by renter and owner or women, men, girls, and boys.
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consumption. I then choose the preference parameter such that the resulting elasticity of the extensive
margin of consumption matches the empirical CEX elasticity.14,15
3.2.2 Trade elasticity
For the trade elasticity I take the value estimated by Simonovska and Waugh (2010), θ = 4.5. In
general, one cannot separately identify the trade elasticity and the level of trade costs by estimating a
gravity equation - the trade elasticity may be high and trade costs low or conversely, the elasticity low
and trade costs high. To tackle this problem EK argue that one can use disagregated price data from
the Worldbank’s International Comparison Project (ICP) and take the maximal (or second highest)
within good price difference as an estimate for bilateral trade costs. As the resulting value for trade
costs has been obtained independently from trade volumes one then can solve for the trade elasticity
that is implied by a gravity type regression. Simonovska and Waugh (2010) extend this approach.
They provide a more elaborate estimation strategy that controls for an aggregation bias arising from
the fact that due to the small number of goods categories in the ICP (around 80) it is very unlikely
that the highest price difference represents actually the trade costs. They also use a broader set of
countries (123) and are thus able to check if the trade elasticity systematically varies with development
level, which they find is not the case. The structural framework for their estimation is the EK model.
Since my model behaves similar to the EK model with respect to volumes and prices I can directly
adapt the Simonovska and Waugh (2010) baseline estimate of θ = 4.5.
3.2.3 Trade costs
I calibrate the trade costs using aggregate bilateral trade volumes of the year 2003. In particular I
follow Waugh (2010) in modeling unobserved trade costs as a function of observed proxies and an
exporter fixed effect
dni = exp {δk + b+ l + exi + εni} ,
14The resulting value is x = 3.14. In contrast to for example the elasticity of substitution of CES-preferences this
parameter does not have a standalone interpretation (beyond the fact that it is not zero) since measures such as the
demand elasticity or elasticity of substitution change with income and prices. Therefore x is only meaningful when income
and price distribution are known or as in the case here, when a model giving rise to income and prices is parametrically
specified.
15On a first sight the fact that I use within country inequality to calibrate a model where countries are populated
by representative agents may seem surprising. I address this objection in the robustness section, where I consider the
potential role of within-country inequality. Also I refer to the well-established practice in the macro literature using
microeconomically estimated elasticities to calibrate macro models populated by representative agents.
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where I suppressed the associated dummy variables for expositional simplicity. δk (k = 1, ..., 6) is the
effect of the bilateral distance between countries i and n lying in in the kth distance interval. The
intervals are (in miles): [0, 375), [375, 750), [750, 1500), [1500, 3000), [3000, 6000), and [6000,∞). b is
the effect of sharing a border, and l the effect of having the same language. exi is an exporter fixed
effect that allows for asymmetry in bilateral trade costs and εni captures all other trade barriers and
is assumed to be orthogonal to the exporter fixed effects, distance, border, language, and membership
in the same trade agreement.
Normalizing the volume of the bilateral trade flow from i to n (equation (8)) with the importer’s
home sales Xnn yields
Xni
Xnn
= (dni)
−θ Si
Sn
, (11)
where Si = Ti (wi)
−θ is a country fixed effect. The value of the bilateral trade flow Xni is observed,
whereas - in the context of the model - Xnn is simply a country’s aggregate gdp less its total imports.16
Imposing above trade cost function yields a Gravity-type equation that I estimate using the Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Table 3 reports the
resulting estimates for the trade cost parameters together with the associated effects on trade costs
and some summary statistics on the estimated trade costs.
Table 3
The average and median trade costs among OECD countries are 2.01 and 1.89 respectively, which
is slightly higher than often cited 1.7 suggested by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) and very much
in line with Waugh (2010). Consistent with the findings in the literature trade costs among non-OECD
countries are considerably higher.
3.2.4 Technologies
The most straightforward approach to recovering technologies is to follow Fieler (2010) and take per-
capita incomes17 as a proxy for wages - indeed in the model wages and per-capita incomes coincide.
16It is important to mention two potential caveats related to the way the model is mapped to the data. First, I
use aggregate trade volume, which includes also non-consumption goods such as intermediates. Second, whereas trade
is measured in gross values gdp is measured as value added, which again in the context of intermediates may be of
importance. I address both caveats in the robustness section where I extend the model to allow for intermediates. It
turns out that the main results remain basically the same. The reason for this may be that the share of consumption
goods in trade flows is unrelated to per-capita gdp and aggregate gdp, so that no systematic bias emerges.
17In the context of the model using nominal incomes is appropriate as deviations from PPP are endogenous in the EK
framework.
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Using the estimates for the country fixed effects, Sˆi, one then can directly solve for the implied
technologies, Tˆi = Sˆi (wi)
θ. An alternative approach disregards the country fixed effects and uses
the market clearing conditions (9) to recover the technologies: Plugging the per-capita incomes, the
estimated trade costs and the trade elasticity into the market clearing conditions allows me to solve
for the unique set of technologies for which all markets clear. Figure 3 plots the expected productivity
draw in a country, Ei [z] = T
1/θ
i , against its per-capita income.
Figure 3
Clearly the two approaches yield very similar technologies. Moreover, as it is to expect there is a high
correlation between estimated technology and observed incomes. However, note that the correlation
is not perfect as different geographic locations imply that countries with the same technology face
differing levels of demand and thus have different equilibrium incomes. For the remainder of the paper
I use the technologies calibrated using the market clearing conditions.18
3.3 Calibration results
Given the calibrated parameters I now can simulate the model and compare the behavior of its extensive
margin to the data. Remember that with respect to volumes the non-homothetic model behaves similar
to the homothetic model. Hence, as we used volumes to calibrate technologies and trade costs, these
calibrated values also apply to the homothetic model. I.e. we obtain the homothetic model’s predictions
simply by setting the non-homotheticity parameter to zero, x = 0.
The motivating fact of this paper is the positive correlations between the extensive margin of bilat-
eral trade and the per-capita incomes of the trading partners. Table 4 reports the income elasticities
that follow from repeating the regressions cited in the introduction using the model data.
Table 4
For the exporter income elasticity both models yield the same elasticity. Moreover the elasticity
is reasonably close to what is observed in the data. For the importer income elasticity on the other
hand only the non-homothetic model’s sign is consistent with the data. With 0.63 the non-homothetic
18The results for the alternative technologies are very similar with differences in the outcomes typically lying within
1-2%.
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model’s elasticity is somewhat higher than the data’s income elasticity of around 0.5, but still reason-
ably close. The homothetic model on the other hand predicts a negative importer income elasticity
of -0.12. The reason for this counterfactual prediction is its negligence of the extensive margin of
consumption. So that only the negative effect of a technologically advanced country producing more
varieties locally is present. In the non-homothetic model this negative effect is dominated by a positive
effect coming from the demand side - the expanding extensive margin of consumption. Figure 4 plots
the calibrated extensive margin of consumption against per-capita income.
Figure 4
Note that the relation is not perfect. The reason for that are differences in the remoteness. Spain and
New Zealand for example had the same nominal per-capita income in 2003, however Spain’s calibrated
extensive margin of consumption is almost 10% higher than New Zealand’s as Spain’s geographic
location is much more favorable. This means that prices tend to be lower in Spain so that its real
income is higher and agents find it optimal to consume a broader set of varieties.
3.4 The quantitative importance of the demand side
In this section I perform two counterfactual experiments. The goal of these exercises is to demonstrate
that accounting for demand side effects is quantitatively important when thinking about the reaction
of the extensive margins of trade to changes in the economic environment. In each case I start with
the world economy as calibrated in the previous section and compare the counterfactual outcome to
the initial situation.
3.4.1 The rise of China and India
One of the most important trends in the global economy is the rise of China and India. These two
countries experienced spectacular growth rates in the recent years - according to the World Develop-
ment Indicators (Worldbank, 2010) China’s per-capita income almost doubled (95%) relative to the
world per-capita income between 1993 and 2003, important India’s per-capita income grew by 31%
relative to world per-capita income. In this experiment I consider the calibrated 2003 world economy
and ask how trade pattern would change if China’s and India’s technologies improve such that their
incomes rose again by the same magnitudes relative to the world income.
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The homothetic model predicts that because China and India’s technologies improve these two
countries become competitive in more varieties. Therefore these countries export broader sets of
varieties (the median increase is 76% for China and 17% for India). At the same time the better
technology implies also that these countries import a narrower set of varieties. In important China
is predicted to source 54% more varieties locally, whereas India’s home share extends by 2%. This
translates into median decreases in the extensive margin of bilateral import flows of 15% and 14% for
China and India respectively.
These predictions turn when one allows for non-homothetic consumer behavior. In the non-
homothetic model China and India extend their extensive margin of consumption as their incomes
increase (82% in China and 34% in India), so that the measures of imported varieties actually increase
by 53% and 33%. This translates into median increases in the extensive margins of bilateral import
flows of 55% for China and 14% for India.
3.4.2 Changes in trade costs
In a second experiment I consider the effect of reductions in trade costs. Lower trade costs affect the
extensive margin of trade trough two channels. The first channel is the standard supply side channel
- lower trade costs imply that trade becomes worthwhile for more varieties, i.e. the extensive margin
of trade will expand. However, there is a second channel operating trough the demand side - lower
trade costs lead to lower prices19 which increases real incomes. With higher incomes agents will find it
optimal to consume broader sets of varieties, which in turn will tend to increase the extensive margins
of trade. In order to assess the relative importance of these two channels I take again the calibrated
2003 world economy and uniformly decrease trade costs by 10, 25, and 50 percent.
From Table 5 reporting summary statistics on the percentage changes in the extensive margins
of bilateral trade the starkly differing predictions of the homothetic and the non-homothetic model
become apparent.
Table 5
The homothetic model for example predicts that for a 25%-reduction in trade costs more than halve
of country-pairs actually experience reductions in the bilateral extensive margins. This is because
low-tech supplier countries were competitive in nearby markets in the initial situation with high trade
19Above I chose the US wage as the numéraire. Therefore I describe the adjustment via lower prices. Alternatively
with some goods price as the numéraire the corresponding adjustment would be described by lower trade costs increasing
productivity and therewith wages.
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costs, but lower trade costs imply that they are now dominated by countries with better technologies
such that their export margins tend to fall. In the non-homothetic model this supply-side effect is
attenuated by the demand-side effect of a rising extensive margin of consumption, the absolute and
relative changes in which are plotted in Figure 5 against per-capita incomes.
Figure 5
Whereas poor countries experience the highest relative changes, middle income countries have the
highest absolute changes. Relative to the supply side effect these changes are large such that for
example the number of country pairs experiencing falling extensive margins goes back to 15% and the
predicted median change is an increase of 22% instead of a decrease of 1% in the homothetic model.
These contrasting predictions demonstrate that it is indeed important to account for demand side
effects when thinking about the extensive margin of bilateral trade.
4 How general is the proposed channel?
I have presented a model of international trade where agents adjust their extensive margin of con-
sumption with income, which has quantitatively important effects for the extensive margin of bilateral
trade. In order to highlight this novel demand side channel, I kept the supply side very simple by
adapting a perfectly competitive Ricardian framework. I found that when allowing for non-homothetic
consumer behavior the EK model is not only able to capture the pattern of aggregate trade volumes,
but also the behavior of the extensive margin of trade. The more general message is that the extensive
margin of trade may be driven by a considerable amount trough differences in demand pattern across
countries. In the following I discuss how this channel generalizes to richer models and why accounting
for the demand side is potentially important.
A richer model of international trade would model the firm explicitly by allowing for market power
as in Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003). Fixed market entry costs implied that not all firms find
it optimal to enter all markets, which gives rise to an extensive margin of trade. In particular, for a
given level of entry costs, it is more attractive to enter bigger markets since the contribution margin
in these markets is larger. With homothetic preferences the notion of a “big market” is purely driven
by aggregate gdp - due to constant expenditure shares it does not matter if we have a large and poor
population or a small and rich population. With non-homothetic preferences however the decompo-
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sition of aggregate gdp becomes relevant as poor agents adjust their expenditure shares with income.
In the model developed above this is particularly apparent when the expenditure share goes from zero
(when the non-negativity constraint is binding) to some positive share - the thus emerging extensive
margin of consumption then drives the extensive margin of trade. In a more general setting with
market entry costs it is not only the bounded marginal utility that is relevant but also poor agents
relatively concentrating their expenditures on cheap goods. A small, but rich market may therefore
be sufficiently “big”, whereas demand in the poor, but populous market (with the same aggregate gdp)
may be too low for the operating profits to cover market entry costs - accordingly the small, but rich
market’s extensive margins of import flows will tend to be higher than the ones of the large, but poor
market. Clearly, in such a framework it would not only be average income, but also the entire shape of
the income distribution that is relevant for a firm’s entry decision. Ignoring non-homothetic demand
thus leads a researcher to attribute differences in the extensive margins of import flows entirely to
differences in market entry costs, whereas a considerable part of it may be driven by differences in
average income and the income distribution.
5 Robustness and extensions
5.1 Extending the model to trade in intermediates
The model I developed above is one of consumption goods only. I chose to abstract from intermediate
goods to keep the model as simple as possible. In this section I outline a model with intermediate
goods and final goods - both tradable. The purpose of this extension is twofold: First, I use the
extended model to assess if abstracting from intermediate goods introduces a significant bias in the
quantification. Second, to compute the left hand side of equation (11) I used trade and gdp data.
However, many papers using the EK framework are models of trade in intermediates, in the context of
which gross manufacturing output is used instead of gdp data. With the intermediate extension I will
need to use gross manufacturing output and thus one can assess by how much the results were driven
by these different ways of computing the normalized trade flows.
In the extended model there are two industries, ι = I, F . I produces tradable intermediate goods
and F produces tradable final goods.20 Both industries bundle labor and a CES-aggregate of inter-
mediates using a Cobb-Douglas production technology with labor share β. Cost minimization implies
20Note that in EK and follow up papers it is usually assumed that final goods are non-traded.
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that the price of at which country i can offer a industry ι-variety jι in market n is
pni (jι) =
dni
zi (jι)
wβi P
1−β
i ,
where Pi =
(´ 1
0
p (jI)
1−σ
djI
)1/(1−σ)
is the CES price index.21 I omitted a constant depending on
the labor share β. For expositional simplicity I will omit constants in the following formulas, which
corresponds to a particular normalization of technologies. Assuming Fréchet distributed productivities
with similar parameters across industries yields a gravity-like expression that looks in its reduced form
similar to the one derived above
Xni
Xnn
= (dni)
−θ Si
Sn
.
However, there are two crucial differences: First, total demand, Xn, is now the total intermediate
absorption, XIn, plus total final goods demand, XFn . Consequently, following EK the home supply now
has to be imputed by subtracting a country’s total manufacturing exports from its gross manufacturing
output, which I mostly get from UNIDO (2003) (details in Appendix A.6). Data constraints reduce
the sample to 71 countries. Second the country fixed effects include now the countries’ intermediate
price indices, Si = Ti
(
wβi P
1−β
i
)−θ
. Note that in the simple model without intermediates the price
indices Pi were absorbed into the calibrated technologies and wages entered with an exponent of one,
which implies that the model tended to overstate the dispersion in technologies (standard deviation in
log of technologies is 2.7 with intermediates22 vs. 7.5 without intermediates). Explicitly considering
intermediates may particularly matter for counterfactual experiments changing the trade costs, as this
implies potentially large changes in the intermediate price indices.
Using the same procedure as in the main text (but a different measure for Xnn) I can estimate
the trade costs and the country fixed effects. To recover technologies there are again two approaches:
The more direct approach uses the estimated country fixed effects, Ŝi and trade costs, dˆni, to compute
the implied price indices, Pˆn =
(∑N
i=1 Ti
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)−θ)−1/θ
=
(∑N
i=1 Sˆi
(
d̂ni
)−θ)−1/θ
and then
use these price indices together with the per-capita incomes, wi, and calibrated values for β and θ to
solve for the implied technologies, T̂i = Ŝi
(
wβi P̂
1−β
i
)θ
. Alternatively, one can combine the estimated
trade costs and the per-capita incomes and solve directly for the unique set of technologies for which
all markets clear.23 The correlation (in logs) between the thus calibrated technologies is very high at
21I assume that trade costs and labor share are the same across the two industries.
22The standard deviation of log
(
TiP
−(1−β)θ
i
)
, i.e. the technologies with absorbed intermediate price index is 2.9.
23Specifically, I take an initial guess for the technology vector, compute the implied price indices, and use these together
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0.96. I use the technologies based on imposing market clearing.
The price distribution of final goods in country n is
Gn (p) = 1− exp
{
−pθ
N∑
i=1
Ti
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)−θ}
.
Normalizing technologies such that
∑N
i=1 Ti
(
wβi P
1−β
i dUSi
)−θ
= 1 I can use the same value for the
non-homotheticity parameter as above. Simulating the thus calibrated model yields an importer in-
come elasticity of the extensive margin of bilateral trade of 0.58 (the corresponding elasticity in the
model without intermediates is 0.57 whereas the empirical elasticity is 0.50 in the restricted sample
of 71 countries). Considering the counterfactual experiments, the model with intermediates generally
features even stronger differences between the predictions of the homothetic and the non-homothetic
model. This is because the intermediate price index reacts to changes in trade costs or technologies
respectively, which amplifies the reaction of the price distribution of final goods and thus agents tend
to adjust their extensive margins of consumption more strongly.
5.2 Inequality
Up to now I abstracted from within-country inequality and had each country populated by represen-
tative agents. Although most of the global inequality is indeed explained by differences in average
incomes, within-country inequality is a potentially important determinant for the extensive margin of
trade - consider two countries with the same average income, but one with a wider range of the income
distribution. My model would predict that the country with the richer agents has a broader extensive
margin of consumption and thus tends to import more varieties.24
Taking my model literally implies that if each country features one very rich agents all countries
extensive margins of consumption were one and all the demand side effect disappeared. I.e. this model’s
extensive margin is very sensitive to the upper tail of the income distribution. The main theoretical
reason why this may not be the case is the presence of fixed market entry costs (beachhead costs).
Incorporating these into my model would require departures from the competitive setting to allow
for positive markups that can be used to cover the beachhead costs, which would disproportionally
with the initial guess to compute pini and then the countries’ balances of payments. I adjust the technology guess using
a tâtonnement-like algorithm until all markets clear.
24Indeed, when repeating the regressions cited in the introduction including the importer’s top-quintile of the income
distribution I get positive coefficients for the top-quintile. The elasticity considering consumption goods only is 0.23 and
significant at the 1% level, whereas the elasticity for all types of goods is lower at 0.15 and significant only at the 10%
level.
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complicate the model.25
In order to nonetheless get a feeling for the potential importance of the within-country income
distribution I propose a simple exercise that allows me to stay within the Ricardian framework. In
particular I choose to use the average income in the top quintile to compute the extensive margin
of consumption: Remember that conditional on entering market n the price distribution is the same
across supplier countries. Therefore agents will have the same average expenditures across countries,
which implies that pini is the expenditure share of each agent independent of his total expenditures.
Consequently the aggregate value of the flow from i to n is still Xni = piniwnLn. I.e. aggregate volumes
do not depend on the income distribution so that we can use the same calibration strategy as above.
The non-homotheticity parameter x calibrated using the CEX data remains unchanged. However, I
acknowledge the presence of within-country inequality by using the average income among the top
quintile in the budget constraint (10) instead of per-capita income. Taking the model literally this
amounts to allowing for a general income distribution that is bounded by the average income in the
top quintile. In a more general sense I hope to learn from this exercise how the results change when
trying to account for differences at the top of countries’ income distributions.
I use quintile data from UNU-WIDER (2008) that are described in detail in Appendix A.7. As the
quintiles are not available for the full sample I consider a smaller sample of 112 countries. I reestimate
the model parameters for this smaller sample of countries.26 Accounting for within-country inequality
by using average incomes in the top quintiles in the budget constraint yields a lower importer income
elasticity of 0.52 (vs. 0.46 in the data).
5.3 Alternative utility functions
In the theory part I worked with a general utility function with the crucial feature of a bounded
marginal utility. For the quantification I then had to assume some particular functional form for the
utility function (Stone-Geary). This section considers two alternative utility functions with bounded
marginal utility and shows that the calibration results are robust to the particular functional form. I
25With non-homothetic preferences markups become endogenous. With a representative agent the model still preserves
some tractability (see Simonovska (2010)) as per market there is one cutoff productivity above which firms enter this
market and below which firms abstain from entering. However, if one introduces within-country inequality firms not only
decide whether to enter a market or not, but also whom to supply in this market. I.e. the equilibrium is characterized
by a correspondence between productivity and income of the agent that just consumes this firms variety at the optimal
quantity of zero. Unfortunately, there is no simple expression for this correspondence. Since each country has its own
productivity and income distributions, there are N2 such correspondences, which is the reason why the model loses all
its tractability.
26For this smaller sample of countries the calibrated importer income elasticity for the representative agent model
barely changes (0.62 instead of 0.63).
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only consider one-parameter utility functions as my calibration strategy for the demand side targets
only one moment.
In particular, I consider quadratic utility
vquadr (x) = x− 1
2
aquadrx2,
which is popular for its linear demand functions and constant absolute risk aversion utility (CARA)
vcara (x) = − exp {−acarax} .
A reader might note that often these utility functions are written with three parameters.27 However, in
the context of a static trade model utility functions have a pure ordinal purpose so that all monotonic
transformations of the utility function, U =
´
v (x (j)) dj, yield the same economic behavior.28 The
one-parameter versions above are simply linear transformations of the often seen three parameter
versions.
As aggregate trade volumes do not depend on the particular functional form of the utility function
the supply side parameters calibrated above (trade elasticity, trade costs, technologies) still apply, i.e.
I only need to recalibrate the demand side parameter. In Appendix B.5 I derive the analog to equation
(10) governing the extensive margin of consumption for a given income and price distribution. Using
these equations I calibrate the new utility parameters by targeting US consumers’ income elasticity of
the extensive margin consumption.29 I then simulate the calibrated models and calculate the income
elasticities of the extensive margin. The resulting exporter income elasticities are the same as above
as they do not depend on the demand side of the model. The importer income elasticities on the other
hand crucially depend on the demand side as demonstrated above when comparing the homothetic
model with the non-homothetic model. However, when considering the alternative non-homothetic
utility functions the importer income elasticities change only very little (0.618 for CARA and 0.623
for quadratic preferences instead of 0.614 for Stone-Geary). Similarly, the quantitative effects in
the counterfactual experiments do not significantly change. These results demonstrate that whereas
accounting for non-homotheticity when thinking about the extensive margin of trade is very important,
the quantitative behavior does not seem to depend very much on the particular functional form.
27vcara (x) = Bquadr − Cquadr exp{−aquadrx} and vquadr (x) = Bcara + Ccarax− 1/2acarax2.
28It is important to note, that the transformation is applied to the aggregate utility function, U , and not directly to
the sub-utility function.
29The resulting parameters are aquadr = 3.59 and acara = 0.33.
24
6 Conclusions
In this paper I discuss the importing country’s demand structure as a determinant of the extensive
margin of bilateral trade. I draw on the evidence of microeconomic studies that show that richer agents
consume more variety. Allowing for such an extensive margin of consumption in an otherwise standard
Ricardian trade model offers an explanation for the positive correlation between the extensive margin
of bilateral trade and the importers per-capita income. I quantify the model using data on aggregate
trade volumes, and US consumer behavior. I find that the calibrated model’s extensive margin of trade
behaves similar to what we observe in the data. Two counterfactual experiments demonstrate that
this novel demand side channel is quantitatively important.
I mentioned in the introduction that other authors have used non-homothetic preferences to discuss
different aspects of the pattern of international trade such as aggregate volumes and quality. A
potentially fruitful avenue for future research is a model where these two aspects and the extensive
margin of trade could be analyzed simultaneously. On the demand side, such a framework would
feature agents that adjust their consumption decision at the intensive, the extensive, and the quality
margin. On the supply side variations in countries abilities to produce quality goods would introduce
comparative advantages. Trade pattern – volumes, extensive margin, and quality – could then be
analyzed as the result of interactions of the exporter country’s production structure and the importer
country’s demand pattern.
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A Data
I use data for the year 2003. In the baseline specification the sample consists of 164 countries, which
corresponds to 26732 = 164 ∗ 163 bilateral trade relations. Table 6 lists the countries in the sample.
In the following I describe the sources of the data that is used in the quantification.
A.1 Aggregate value of bilateral trade
I use the COMTRADE trade data of the year 2003 as provided by CEPII (Gaulier, Zignago, Sondjo,
Sissoko, and Paillacar, 2010). This data set provides the dollar values of the bilateral trade flows
between 239 economic entities (mostly countries) on the HS6 level of aggregation Xni (j), which cor-
responds to 5111 goods categories. Summing over all HS6 categories I get the aggregate value of a
bilateral trade flow from exporting country i to the importing country n, Xni =
∑5111
j=1 Xni (j) .
A.2 Extensive margin of bilateral trade
A simple and intuitive measure for the extensive margin is to count the number of HS6 categories with
positive volumes
mni =
∑
j
I (Xni (j) > 0) ,
where I (Xni (j) > 0) is an indicator function taking the value of one if the bilateral trade flow from
i to n in the HS6-category j is positive. A potential drawback of this measure is the fact that the
HS6-categories are defined for custom purposes, which is why heavily regulated goods tend to have
more categories. The associated measurement error is absorbed into the error term and the estimated
elasticities are unbiased if the coarseness of the traded HS6-categories is orthogonal to the regressors.
An alternative measure for the extensive margin is brought forward by Broda and Weinstein (2006)
mBWni =
∑
j Xn (j) I (Xni (j) > 0)∑
j Xn (j)
,
where Xn (j) =
∑
k 6=n,iXnk (j) is the value of country n’s total imports in category j. There are
two reasons why this measure may be inappropriate in my context. First, this measure is derived
using a CES-demand system (Feenstra, 1994), whereas the central assumption in my model is that
preferences are non-CES. Second, it has been argued that besides being directly derived from an
underlying preference structure the advantage of this measure is that the categories are weighted
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which may alleviate measurement errors due to differences in the coarseness of the categorization.
In the context of my model, the numerator then would represent the extensive margin of bilateral
trade, mni, and the denominator is the multilateral extensive margin of imports, i.e. the measure of
varieties that are sourced internationally,
∑
k 6=nmnk. Using the corresponding expressions from the
model one sees that the central element of my theory - the extensive margin of consumption - cancels,
mni/
∑
k 6=nmnk = pini/ (1− pinn). In other words the Broda and Weinstein (2006)-measure is unlikely
to reflect the income effects coming from the non-homothetic consumer behavior.
A.3 Per-capita incomes and population sizes
The per-capita incomes and the population sizes are taken from the Worldbank’s World Development
Indicator. The per-capita incomes are measured in current (year 2003) US-dollars. Following EK
I deliberately abstain from using purchasing power adjusted incomes as deviations from PPP arise
endogenously in the EK framework.
A.4 Bilateral distances, shared border, and common language
All transportation cost proxies are from the database provided by CEPII. The bilateral distance is
measured as the distance between two countries’ most populous cities. The common language indicator
takes the value one if two countries have the same official language30 and common border takes the
value one if two countries share a common land-border.
A.5 CEX
The US consumer expenditure survey (CEX) is a rotating panel collected by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). Its “interview survey” part provides detailed information on household characteristics
and expenditures. One of the main purpose of the survey its use in determining and revising the
baskets that are used for the computation of the consumer price index. I obtain the CEX data from
the website of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). A detailed
documentation of the data can be found in BLS (2003). In the following I briefly discuss the raw data
and how I processed the raw data.
The unit of observation in the CEX is a “consumer unit”, CU, which basically comprises of all
30The results remain basically unchanged when using major languages instead of official languages.
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members of a household using their income to make joint expenditures.31 Each CU is in the panel
for 5 consecutive quarters with one interview per quarter. The initial interview only collects demo-
graphic characteristics, whereas the following four interviews collect expenditures from the previous
three months. Expenditures are collected for around 600 categories (represented by “universal classifi-
cation codes”, UCC). Of these 600 UCCs I select the UCCs that correspond to tradable manufactures.
This clearly involves some ad-hoc decisions. I develop two classifications - a conservative classification,
where I disregard all uncertain UCCs and a liberal classification, which includes more UCCs. Partic-
ularly difficult are housing related items since they are often separated by renter, owned home, and
owned vacation home. For the conservative classification I disregard these UCCs all together. In the
liberal classification I lump together the renter and owner categories for the same expense, e.g. I com-
bine the categories “Installed and non-installed replacement wall to wall carpeting for owned homes”
and “Installed and non-installed original wall to wall carpeting for rental homes” into one category,
and ignore UCCs that are only available for either renter or owner such as “Installed and non-installed
original wall to wall carpeting for owned homes”. Another difficult class of UCCs is related to cloths
- a CU buying “men’s footwear” depends very much on if this CU comprises an adult male. There-
fore, in the liberal classification, I lump together UCCs across gender and age, e.g. I collapse “men’s
footwear”, “women’s footwear”, “Boys’ footwear”, and “Girls’ footwear” into one category. The conser-
vative classification disregards these categories. In the end, the liberal classification consists of 186
distinct expenditure categories, whereas the conservative classification comprises of 107 categories.
A.6 Manufacturing absorption
I use data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2003) on gross
manufacturing output. For the year 2003 this database provides the gross manufacturing output for
74 countries. Unfortunately, the database does not include gross output for several large countries,
most notably China. I therefore choose to impute the gross manufacturing output for countries that
belong to the 20 largest economies in 2003 and for which I do not observe gross manufacturing output. I
do this by following Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) and scaling value added in the manufacturing
sector by the average ratio of gross output and value added across countries. These countries are China,
Switzerland, Canada, and Mexico.
31Under this definition a family constitutes a CU, whereas a roomer living with a family would constitute his own CU
as he is financially independent.
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A.7 Top quintiles of income distributions
I get data on the top quintiles of the income distributions from UNU-WIDER (2008). A well-known
problem of inequality data is that the measure to which the inequality data refer varies across countries.
In particular some quintiles refer to expenditures and others to income. Moreover income may be
measured in gross or net terms. To correct for this I follow Dollar and Kraay (2002) and regress the
observed quintiles on dummies for the underlying measure. I then use the resulting coefficients to
estimate the net income quintiles.
B Some derivations
B.1 Derivation of the country specific price distribution Gn (p)
Using the productivity distribution and the pricing equation (4) the probability of country i supplying
a particular variety j at a price lower than p in market n can be written as
Gni (p) = Pr [Pni ≤ p] = Pr
[
widni
Zi (j)
≤ p
]
= Pr
[
widni
p
≤ Zi (j)
]
= 1− exp
{
−Ti (widni)−θ pθ
}
.
The probability that the lowest price on offer in market n is below p is the complement to the
probability that all offered prices lie above p
Gn (p) = Pr
[
min {Pni (j)}Ni=1 ≤ p
]
= 1− Pr
[
min {Pni (j)}Ni=1 > p
]
.
As the productivity draws are iid across countries above probability is simply the product of the
individual probabilities, which yields the price distribution from the main text
Gn (p) = 1−
N∑
i=1
Pr [Pni (j) > p] = 1− exp
{
−pθ
N∑
i=1
Ti (widni)
−θ
}
.
B.2 Derivation of the trade share pini
The probability that country i is the cheapest supplier for a variety j in market n is given by
pini (j) = Pr
[
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
=
ˆ ∞
0
Pr
[
p < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
dGni (p) .
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Again one can write the distribution of the minimum price as the product of the individual distri-
butions
ˆ ∞
0
Pr
[
p < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
dGni (p) =
ˆ ∞
0
∏
k 6=i
Pr [p < Pnk (j)] dGni (p)
=
ˆ ∞
0
∏
k 6=i
Gnk (p) dGni (p) .
Inserting for the price distributions yields
pini (j) =
ˆ ∞
0
∏
k 6=i
Gnk (p) dGni (p) =
Ti (widni)
−θ∑N
k=1 Tk (wkdnk)
−θ .
Note that this probability does not depend on the index j so that it also represents the shares of
varieties for which country i is the cheapest supplier in n
pini (j) = pini =
Ti (widni)
−θ
Φn
.
B.3 Conditional on entry price distributions are the same across sources
The distribution of prices from country i in market n conditional on being the cheapest supplier is
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p|Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
=
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p, Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
Pr
[
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
] .
The denominator is pini. The nominator can be written as
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p, Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
=
ˆ p
0
Pr
[
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
dGni (p) .
Similar steps as above yield
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p, Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
= piniGn (p) .
Reinserting this into the initial expression completes the proof
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p|Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
= Gn (p) = Pr
[
min {Pnk (j)}Ni=1 ≤ p
]
.
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B.4 Derivation of the budget constraint for Stone-Geary preferences
First note that with Stone-Geary utility the first order conditions (1) become
1
x (j) + x¯
= λp (j) for x (j) > 0
1
x¯
< λp (j) for x (j) = 0.
Using these first order conditions I can solve for the price of the marginal variety
p (M) =
v′ (0)
λ
=
1
x¯λ
and for the inverse of the marginal utility of income respectively
1
λ
= x¯p (M) .
Optimal expenditures for varieties j < M are
p (j)x (j) =
1
λ
− x¯p (j) = x¯ (p (M)− p (j)) .
Inserting this into a country n agent’s budget restriction (3) yields
wn = x¯
(
p (Mn)Mn −
ˆ p(M)
0
pdGn (p)
)
.
Using the country specific price distribution Gn (p) one can write
p (Mn) = G
−1
n (Mn) =
(
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
) 1
θ
and
dGn (p) = θp
θ−1Φn exp
{−pθΦn} dp.
Substituting this into the budget contraint yields
wn = x¯
((
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
) 1
θ
Mn −
ˆ p(M)
0
pθpθ−1Φn exp
{−pθΦn} dp) .
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Changing variables in the integral, t = pθΦn,
wn = x¯
((
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
) 1
θ
Mn −
ˆ p(Mn)θΦn
0
(
t
Φn
) 1
θ
exp {−t} dt
)
,
where the integral equals the incomplete Gamma function so that we can write
wn = x¯
((
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
) 1
θ
Mn −
(
1
Φn
) 1
θ
γ
(
1
θ
+ 1, p (Mn)
θ
Φn
))
.
Substituting for the price of the marginal variety and rearranging leads finally to the expression of the
main text.
B.5 Deriving the budget constraint for alternative utility functions
In the following I derive analogs to equation (10) for quadratic and CARA preferences. The resulting
equations pin down the extensive margin of consumption for a given income, E, and price distribution,
G (p) = 1− exp{−Φpθ} .
B.5.1 Quadratic utility
With quadratic utility we have
v′ (x) = 1− aquadrx.
So that optimal expenditures are
px =
(
aquadrp− λp2) .
Inserting this and the country specific price distribution into the budget constraint yields
E =
(
aquadr
ˆ p(M)
0
pΦθpθ−1 exp
{−Φpθ} dp− λ ˆ p(M)
0
p2Φθpθ−1 exp
{−Φpθ} dp) .
Changing variables, t = Φpθ, we get
E =
(
aquadr
ˆ p(M)
0
(
t
Φ
) 1
θ
exp {−t} dt− λ
ˆ p(M)
0
(
t
Φ
) 2
θ
exp {−t} dt
)
.
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Using the first order condition for the extensive margin of consumption, aquadr = λp (M), I can
substitute for λ
E = aquadr
(ˆ Φp(M)θ
0
(
t
Φ
) 1
θ
exp {−t} dt− 1
p (M)
ˆ Φp(M)θ
0
(
t
Φ
) 2
θ
exp {−t} dt
)
.
The integrals are incomplete Gamma functions
E = aquadr
(
(Φ)
− 1θ γ
(
1
θ
+ 1; Φp (M)
θ
)
− 1
p (M)
(Φ)
− 2θ γ
(
2
θ
+ 1; Φp (M)
θ
))
.
From the price distribution we have Φp (M)θ = − log (1−M) and p (M) =
(− log (1−M) /Φ)−1/θ, so that
E = aquadr (Φ)
− 1θ γ
(
1
θ
+ 1;− log (1−M)
)
− aquadr (Φ)− 1θ (− log (1−M))− 1θ γ
(
2
θ
+ 1;− log (1−M)
)
.
B.6 CARA
With CARA we have
v′ (x) = acara exp (−acarax) .
Optimal expenditures are
px = − p
acara
log
(
λp
acara
)
.
As the price of the marginal variety is p (M) = acara/λ we can write
px = − p
acara
log
(
p
p (M)
)
.
Inserting this into the budget constraint
E = − 1
acara
ˆ p(M)
0
p log
(
p
p (M)
)
dG (p)
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and substituting for p (M) and dG (p) we get
E = − θΦ
acara
ˆ (− log(1−M)/Φ) 1θ
0
log
((
− log (1−M)
Φ
)− 1θ
p
)
pθ exp
(−Φpθ) dp.
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Table 1: Dependent variable - extensive margin of bilateral trade
variable coefficient
per-capita income exporter 0.66∗∗∗
importer 0.47∗∗∗
population size exporter 0.65∗∗∗
importer 0.30∗∗∗
bilateral distance [375, 750) −0.78∗∗∗
[750, 1500) −1.49∗∗∗
[1500, 3000) −2.26∗∗∗
[3000, 6000) −2.50∗∗∗
[6000,∞) −2.88∗∗∗
additional controls shared border 0.45∗∗∗
same language 0.74∗∗∗
N = 16053, R2 = 0.63, ∗∗∗ implies significance at the 1%-level
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Table 2: Dependent variable - extensive margin of consumption
specification I II III IV
classification cons. liberal cons. liberal cons. liberal cons. liberal
expenditures 0.48∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
age dummies no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
HH members no no no no yes yes yes yes
geography no no no no no no yes yes
N 2981 2982 2981 2982 2846 2847 2846 2847
R2 0.33 0.39 0.35 0.42 0.36 0.43 0.38 0.44
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Table 3: Estimated trade costs
estimated coefficients
variable coefficient %-effect
[375, 750) −0.53∗∗∗ 13%
[750, 1500) −1.52∗∗∗ 40%
[1500, 3000) −1.97∗∗∗ 55%
[3000, 6000) −2.84∗∗∗ 88%
[6000,∞) −3.33∗∗∗ 110%
shared border 0.77∗∗∗ -16%
same language 0.82∗∗∗ -17%
estimated trade costs (dni)
mean∗∗∗ median
OECD 2.01∗∗∗ 1.89
non-OECD 4.27∗∗∗ 3.53
all countries 3.91∗∗∗ 3.14
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Table 4: : Income elasticities of the extensive margin of bilateral trade
elasticities in data elasticities in models
all vars C only non-homothetic homothetic
exporter income 0.83 0.65 0.86 0.86
importer income 0.49 0.46 0.63 -0.12
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Table 5: : Summary statistics for changes in trade costs
10%-reduction 25%-reduction 50%-reduction
new EK new EK new EK
mean 9% 2% 27% 5% 103% 37%
median 8% 0.1% 22% -1% 85% 18%
top10% 22% 16% 65% 43% 207% 118%
bottom10% -2% -11% -3% -25% 16% -31%
% negative 15% 49% 15% 51% 6% 35%
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Table 6: List of countries in sample
Afghanistan Czech Republic Kuwait Sao Tome and Principe
Albania Denmark Kyrgyzstan Saudi Arabia
Algeria Dominica Lao PDR Senegal
Angola Dominican Republic Latvia Seychelles
Antigua and Barbuda Ecuador Lebanon Sierra Leone
Argentina Egypt Libya Singapore and Malaysia
Armenia El Salvador Lithuania Slovakia
Australia Equatorial Guinea Macau Slovenia
Austria Eritrea Macedonia Solomon Islands
Azerbaijan Estonia Madagascar South Africa
Bahamas Ethiopia Malawi Spain
Bangladesh Fiji Mali Sri Lanka
Barbados Finland Malta St. Kitts and Nevis
Belarus France Mauritania St. Lucia
Belgium and Luxembourg Gabon Mauritius Sudan
Belize Georgia Mexico Suriname
Benin Germany Moldova Sweden
Bhutan Ghana Mongolia Switzerland
Bolivia Greece Morocco Syria
Bosnia and Herzegovina Grenada Mozambique Tajikistan
Brazil Guatemala Nepal Tanzania
Brunei Darussalam Guinea Netherlands Thailand
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau New Zealand Togo
Burkina Faso Guyana Nicaragua Tonga
Burundi Honduras Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Cambodia Hungary Nigeria Tunisia
Cameroon Iceland Norway Turkey
Canada India Oman Turkmenistan
Cape Verde Indonesia Pakistan Uganda
Central African Republic Iran Palau Ukraine
Chad Iraq Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates
Chile Ireland Paraguay United Kingdom
China and Hong Kong Israel Peru United States of America
Colombia Italy Philippines Uruguay
Comoros Jamaica Poland Uzbekistan
Congo, Dem. Rep. Japan Portugal Vanuatu
Congo, Rep. Jordan Qatar Venezuela
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Romania Vietnam
Cote d’Ivoire Kenya Russia Yemen
Croatia Kiribati Rwanda Zambia
Cyprus Korea, Republic of Samoa Zimbabwe
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Figure 1: Demand function
44
Figure 2: Extensive margin of consumption
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Figure 3: Calibrated technologies vs. observed incomes
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Figure 4: Calibrated extensive margins of consumption vs. observed incomes
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Figure 5: Absolute and relative changes in the extensive margin of consumption
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